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Poor economic performance of minority groups and large economic disparity between these groups
and the majority group are major concerns in most countries. In many of these countries, the
mother tongue of the latter group is the common language in national business and in inter-group
communications. How much weights should be placed on common language education and on ethnic
language education is a crucial issue in school education of minority students.
This paper develops a model to examine the issue theoretically. It is shown that balanced
education of the two languages is critical for skill development of individuals with limited wealth.
It is also found that balanced dual education is desirable in terms of earnings net of educational
expenditure and consumption, only when the country has favorable conditions (TFP is reasonably
high and education is reasonably e¤ective in skill development) and only for those with adequate
wealth. Common-language-only education maximizes net earnings and consumption of those with
little wealth, and, when the countrys conditions are not good, maximizes the economic outcomes
of all. Policy implications of the results are discussed. The paper also examines implications of the
asymmetric language positions of the groups for sectoral choices and within-group inequalities.
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1 Introduction
Poor economic performance of minority (or subordinate) groups and large disparity between these
groups and the majority (or dominant) group are major concerns in many countries. Large ethnic
inequality has serious consequences: Alesina, Michalopoulos, and Papaioannou (2016), based on
cross-sectional data of 173 countries, nd that inequality in economic well-being among ethnic
groups, rather than ethnic diversity per se, is strongly negatively related to economic development.
Discrimination, inequality in endowment such as wealth, and inequality in political power are
considered as main factors behind the worrying situation of minority (or subordinate) groups.
What receives limited attention is language barriers they face: in many countries, the mother
tongue of the largest or most powerful ethnic group is the common language in national business
and in inter-group communications, such as Spanish in Bolivia, Mandarin in China, Amharic in
Ethiopia, Turkish in Turkey, and Vietnamese in Vietnam.
How much weights should be placed on teaching a local ethnic language and teaching the
common language and which language should be used as a language of instruction of other subjects
are crucial issues in school education of minority students. Even today, ethnic language education
remains limited in many countries: as many as 40% of students in the world do not have access to
education in a language they speak or understand (Walter and Benson, 2012). Recently, countries
such as Bolivia (Haboud and Limerick, 2017), Ethiopia (Benson et al., 2012) and the Philippines
(Tupas and Martin, 2017) have greatly increased the weight on mother tongue education, while
countries such as China (Gao and Wang, 2017), Turkey (Faltis, 2014), and Vietnam (Nguyen and
Nguyen, 2019) have maintained or intensied the emphasis on common language education.
Empirical works suggest that acquiring common language skill, though di¢cult for the minority,
is rewarding. Azam, Chin, and Prakash (2013) show that the return to speak uent English in India
is as large as the return to secondary education and half as large as the return to college education,
after controlling for education, age, social group, geography, and proxies for ability. Nguyen et al.
(2017) nd that a lack of prociency in Vietnamese of the minority is a major contributor to the
disparity in household expenditures between them and the majority. By contrast, acquiring the
skill to use the ethnic language is less demanding, because it is the mother tongue and a part of
the skill is taught at home, but its use is limited to the local ethnic business and community.
A general consensus among specialists on language and education is that placing emphasis
on ethnic language education at least in primary education is important for students to acquire
adequate language and non-language skill (Ball, 2011; Heugh, 2011). By contrast, we know very
little what is a desirable combination of the two types of education in terms of future earnings and
consumption and what kind of educational and economic policies should be conducted when both
educational and economic outcomes of students are taken into account. The main purpose of this
paper is to develop a simple model to examine these important issues theoretically. The paper also
examines implications of the fact that the common language is the mother tongue of the majority
but not of the minority for sectoral choices and within-group inequalities of the two groups.
Model: The model economy is populated by two ethnic groups, the majority or dominant
group (thereafter the majority) and the minority or subordinate group (thereafter the minority),
and is composed of three production sectors, the national sector and group-specic local sectors. In
the real economy, national (local) sector jobs correspond to many jobs in companies doing business
nationwide (locally) and jobs involving communications with other groups (locals).
Working in the national sector requires the skill to use the common language, which is the
ethnic language of the majority, while working in the local sector of an ethnic group demands the
skill to use the groups ethnic language. This implies that the skills required in the two sectors are
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the same for the majority, while they are di¤erent for the minority.
Each person has wealth (endowment) to expend on education for developing these skills. The
minority, who build up both skills, cannot choose the allocation of the expenditure over the devel-
opment of the two skills; it is xed reecting the fact that weights on common language education
and ethnic language education are mostly determined by the government in basic education. The
level of common language skill of the minority is zero without education, while the level of mother
tongue skill is positive without education (i.e., a portion of the skill is developed at home).1
Individuals must self-nance education due to the absence of credit market. The distribution
of wealth is such that some individuals do not have enough wealth to make the optimal level of
investment, although the case in which nobody faces the wealth constraint is also analyzed. The
setting reects the fact that, in many countries, students must rely on family wealth to pay for
study materials, commuting cost, and others even when public schools do not charge tuitions. After
educational investment, individuals choose a sector to work, receive earnings, and consume.
Results: The paper examines implications of the asymmetric language positions of the groups
for sectoral choices and within-group inequalities and e¤ects of weights on the two types of education
on levels and inter-group inequalities of skill, earnings, and consumption. Main results can be
summarized as follows.
First, while the national and local sectors are indi¤erent to the majority, minority individuals
with relatively large wealth choose the national sector and less wealthy ones choose the local sector.
That is, the national sector is "ranked" higher than the local sector only for the minority. The
reason is that, unlike the majority and unlike working in the local sector, education is a prerequisite
for the minority to work in the national sector. Stemming from the contrasting sectoral choices of
the groups, a change in within-group wealth inequality tends to have greater e¤ects on within-group
inequalities in earnings and consumption of the minority than the inequalities of the majority.
Second, regarding skill development of the minority, balanced allocation of expenditure to com-
mon language education and mother tongue education is crucial for those with limited wealth who
choose the local sector: when the allocation is very biased, their return to educational investment
becomes negative and they do not spend on education.2 As for future national sector workers,
common-language-only education could maximize the skill for the sector under certain conditions.
However, considering that mother tongue skill is important for o¤-the-job activities such as child-
rearing, the dual education is benecial for them too. Thus, the result is mostly consistent with
the aforementioned consensus among specialists on language and education.
Third, regarding earnings net of educational expenditure and consumption of the minority,
balanced dual education is desirable only when the country has favorable conditions (i.e., sectoral
productivities and the e¤ectiveness of education are su¢ciently high, and the proportion of those
with adequate wealth for education is not very low) and only for those with su¢cient wealth.
Common-language-only education is always optimal for those with little wealth and, when the
countrys conditions are bad, it is optimal for all.3 In the real economy, the conditions are closely
related to the level of economic and social development. Thus, the result implies that, in general,
1For analytical tractability, the model abstracts from non-language skill. Main results would not change by
including non-language skill as an input of human capital production functions.
2This result might appear implausible, since most of students take some education even in poor countries. The
di¤erence from real economy arises because, for analytical tractability, the model abstracts from non-investment
motives for attending school, including consumption motives (joys of studying or attending school) and social motives
(pleasure of doing what friends do, pressure from family members or the community to attend school).
3 It is also found that common-language-only education is denitely better than introducing mother tongue edu-
cation on a small scale : the latter does not change human capital of those choosing the local sector, lowers human
capital of those choosing the national sector, and lowers net earnings and consumption of all.
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if the level of development is low, common-language-only education is desirable in terms of the
economic outcomes, otherwise, balanced bilingual education is desirable except for the very poor.
Finally, because the majority are not a¤ected by weights on the two types of education the
minority receive, the above results directly apply to inter-group inequalities in skill, net earnings,
and consumption. For example, switching from exclusively common language education to balanced
dual education is able to curtail the inter-group inequalities in earnings and consumption (except
at the bottom of the distributions) only when the country has favorable conditions.
Policy implications: These results suggest that policies that bring good outcomes in both skill
development and consumption to every minority individual and reduce the inter-group inequalities
are di¤erent depending on conditions of the country.
When the conditions are favorable, which is likely to be the case when the level of development
is su¢ciently high, the government should implement balanced bilingual education together with
redistributive policies that support educational investment of those with little wealth, such as
income transfers and tuition subsidy.4 Without the latter policies, the very poor lose economically
from the implementation of the dual education, because they cannot spend su¢ciently enough on
education to benet from it.
By contrast, when the conditions are unfavorable, which is likely to be true when the level of
development is low, what the government should conduct in the rst place is policies changing
the adverse conditions: improving the productivities and the e¤ectiveness of education. If these
policies are conducted on a su¢cient scale, dual education coupled with redistribution towards the
very poor can bring good outcomes to all. On the other hand, if the government cannot implement
these policies on a su¢cient scale for budgetary or other reasons, it faces a di¢cult choice between
educational and economic outcomes.
Finally, the result that a change in within-group wealth inequality tends to have greater e¤ects
on earnings and consumption inequalities of the minority than the inequalities of the majority
suggests that redistributive policies that increase access to education of the poor would be more
important for the minorty than for the majority.
Note that the model does not take into account several important e¤ects of the choice of
language in education. Mother tongue education would raise ethnic language skill and contribute
to the accumulation of social capital in the local ethnic community. It might also stimulate political
participation and increase support for democracy (Albaugh, 2016). Common language education,
on the other hand, would help people identify with the nation and contribute to national unity and
stability. It might also reduce linguistic diversity and promote public goods provision and economic
growth (Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín, and Wacziarg, 2012). Policy implementation in the actual society
needs to take into account these e¤ects as well.
Related literature: To the authors knowledge, this paper, along with Yuki (2018), is the
rst attempt to examine theoretically how weights on two types of education, common language
education and mother tongue education, a¤ect human capital, net earnings, and consumption of
individuals with di¤erent family income. Several works examine related issues theoretically.
Pool (1991) examines the choice of o¢cial language(s) in a multilingual society in which earnings
are exogenous, adopting a non-native o¢cial language is costly, and when there are multiple o¢cial
languages, translation among the languages is costly and nanced by tax. He shows that there exists
e¢cient and fair choice of o¢cial language(s), if appropriate inter-group redistribution is conducted.
Lazear (1999) constructs a model of a multilingual society, in which individuals heterogenous
4Of course, given weights on the two types of education, redistribution towards individuals without enough wealth
for education would be desirable, as long as their return to education is positive. Rather, what is stated here is that
redistribution towards the very poor is needed to implement the dual education, i.e., to choose balanced weights.
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in costs of learning non-native languages decide whether to master languages of other groups,
each individual randomly matches with another individual and the match produces goods only
when the pair can use the same language. He derives several implications of the model and
empirically examines them. Ortega and Tangerås (2008) model a society of two language groups
in which the politically dominant group determine the type(s) of schools accessible to each group
(monolingual school in either language and bilingual school), individuals decide whether to attend
school, and goods are produced from bilateral random matching as in Lazear (1999). They show
that the dominant group choose laissez-faire or restrict access to schools using the language of the
subordinate group, while the subordinate prefer schools using their own language.
Besides examining di¤erent issues, the present work is distinct from these works in the following
respects. First, in the present work, individuals within each ethnic group are heterogenous in
wealth available for education, while in the preceding works, they are either homogenous (Pool;
Ortega and Tangerås) or heterogenous in costs of learning non-native languages, which would
capture di¤erence in innate ability (Lazear). This work adopts the di¤erent setting, because it
mainly focuses on developing countries where family wealth is a critical determinant of educational
investment even in basic education, whereas the existing works largely focus on developed countries.
Second, individuals choose a sector that brings higher net earnings in this work, whereas, in the
previous works, individuals randomly get a "job" (Lazear; Ortega and Tangerås) or earnings are
exogenous (Pool). As in the present model, those who have limited (abundant) wealth to spend on
education tend to choose the local (national) sector in the real economy. Having a more realistic
job choice is important in the model, because the heterogenous e¤ect of the education policy on
earnings of individuals with di¤erent wealth depends on their job choices.
Main di¤erences from Yuki (2018) are as follows. First, common language is the native language
of the dominant group in the present work, whereas ethnic groups are symmetric and common
language is not a native language of any group in Yuki (2018). Such setting is relevant to many sub-
Saharan Africa countries where common language is the language of the former colonizer. Second,
because of the setting of symmetric groups, Yuki (2018) does not examine e¤ects of the education
language policy on between-group inequalities. It does not explore implications of asymmetric
language positions of the two groups for sectoral choices and within-group inequalities either.
Third, human capital production functions of the present model exhibit decreasing returns to
educational expenditure, which are standard and more plausible than linear functions with the
upper bound on the expenditure of Yuki (2018).
In education and linguistics, many works study the e¤ect of educational language policy on aca-
demic achievement of students, and a general consensus among researchers is that placing emphasis
on ethnic language education at least in primary education is important for skill development (Ball,
2011; Heugh, 2011). In economics, a small number of works examine e¤ects on educational and
labor market outcomes empirically. Jain (2017) examines the e¤ect on academic outcomes, using
data of South India, where primary education is largely taught in the o¢cial language of the state.
By comparing districts where the o¢cial language matched the districts language and ones where
it did not, he nds that mismatched districts had lower literacy rates and college graduation rates,
but after reorganization of states on linguistic lines, the previously mismatched districts caught
up with other districts. Ramachandran (2017) nds that the reform in Ethiopia which introduced
mother tongue instruction in primary education has positive e¤ects on reading skill and years of
schooling. These ndings are consistent with the models result on the educational outcome.
As for labor market outcomes, Angrist and Lavy (1997) nd that the policy change of the
1980s in Morocco that replaced French with Arabic as the medium of instruction in post-primary
education greatly lowered returns to schooling. Cappellari and Di Paolo (2018) analyze the e¤ects
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of the 1983 bilingual education reform in Catalonia, which substantially increased the weight on
Catalan in mandatory education (from a very low weight to a slightly higher weight than Spanish),
and nd a positive e¤ect on earnings. Consistent with the models result on earnings, these ndings
suggest that a large increase in the weight on local language education lowers wages in a developing
country (Morocco) and raises wages in a developed region (Catalonia). Chakraborty and Bakshi
(2016) nd that the policy change in the Indian state of West Bengal that abolished English
education in primary schools has a large negative e¤ect on wages. This is consistent with the
models result that education very biased towards local language skill results in low earnings.
Organization of the paper: Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 examines the uncon-
strained case in which everyone has enough wealth for education, and Section 4 considers the
general case in which educational investment of some individuals are wealth-constrained. Section
5 discusses policy implications of the results. Section 6 concludes. Appendix A explains how en-
dogenous variables are determined in the general case, and Appendix B presents proofs of lemmas
and propositions of the unconstrained case. Web Appendix C contains those of the general case.
2 Model
Consider a bilingual society populated by two ethnic groups, groups 1 and 2, and composed of
three sectors, the national sector and group-specic local sectors. The local sector of each group
produces group-specic nal goods using intermediate goods produced by the national sector and
the groups labor, while the national sector produces intermediate goods using labor of both groups.
The alternative interpretation is that individuals consume two kinds of nal goods, goods produced
by the national sector and goods produced by the local sector of their group using labor only.
In the real economy, national sector jobs correspond to many jobs in companies doing business
nationwide and jobs involving communications with other groups, which require common language
skill, while local sector jobs correspond to many jobs in companies doing business locally and jobs
involving communications with local customers, such as jobs in retail, food service, and personal
care, which require local ethnic language skill. The interpretation of the local sectors as sectors
producing group-specic nal goods reects the fact that these services are dominant in the nal
stage of the production process.
The production function of the local sector of group i (i = 1; 2) is5
Yi = (TiHiL)
(YiN )
1 ;  2 (0; 1); (1)
where HiL is the total human capital of workers in the sector, whose determination is explained
later, Ti is the sectors constant productivity, and YiN is the amount of intermediate goods used.
The production function implies that both the human capital and intermediate goods are essential
but they are substitutable to some degree in the production of the nal goods.
The production function of the national sector is
YN = TN (H1N +H2N ); (2)
where HiN is the total human capital of group i workers in the sector and TN is the sectors
constant productivity. Workers of the two groups are perfectly substitutable in the production of
the intermediate goods.
Markets are perfectly competitive. Let the intermediate good be the numeraire. Then, from
(2), the wage rate per human capital of workers in the national sector is
5Under the alternative interpretation that individuals consume two kinds of nal goods, this is the utility function
and the production function of the local sector is Yi = TiHiL.
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wN = TN : (3)
Denote the relative price of the nal good of group i by Pi and the wage rate per human
capital of local sector workers of group i by wiL: Since the prot of the nal good producer is






















Because the nal goods are group-specic, there are no inter-group transactions of the goods.
Thus, the demand for intermediate goods of a group must be equal to the amount of the goods
produced by the groups workers:6
YiN = TNHiN : (7)
By substiting the above equation into (1) and (6), the output of the nal goods and the wage

























The national sector requires the skill to use the common language, and the local sector of an
ethnic group requires the skill to use its ethnic language. Group 1 is supposed to be in the large
majority or has held a dominant position historically and thus the ethnic language of the group is
the common language in the society. This implies that the skills required in the two sectors are
the same for group 1, while they are di¤erent for group 2.
Each person has wealth (endowment) a to expend on education for developing these skills.
Let the amount of educational spending be e: Group 1 individuals develop the skill to use their
ethnic language, whereas group 2 individuals must build up both mother tongue skill and common
language skill. It is assumed that group 2 individuals cannot choose the allocation of spending
over the development of the two types of skills, which is xed reecting the fact that weights on
common language education and local language education in basic education (primary and lower
secondary education) are mostly determined by the government.
The human capital production function of group 1 individuals is
h1  h1N = h1L = (l + e)
 ;  2 (0; 1); l > 0 (11)
6Note, however, that a part of intermediate goods used to produce the nal goods of a group is produced by the
other group. The proportion of intermediate goods used by a group that is produced by the own group is HiN
H1N+H2N
,
which becomes smaller as HiN is smaller.
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where h1N and h1L are human capital in the national sector and in the local sector respectively,
which are same for group 1, and l is a constant. The level of human capital is positive without
education, reecting the fact that mother tongue skill is developed partly at home.
The human capital production functions of group 2 individuals are
h2N = [N (1  s)e]
 ; s 2 [0; 1]; (12)
h2L = (l + Lse)
 ; (13)
where s 2 [0; 1] is the proportion of e allocated to the development of the skill for the local sector,
and N (L) is the productivity of education technology for common language skill (mother tongue
skill).7 The function for the local sector is similar to that of group 1, while the function for the
national sector is di¤erent: the level of the skill for the sector is zero without education, because
the common language is not their mother tongue.8 N < L would be reasonable considering higher
cost e¤ectiveness of mother tongue education in skill development (Vaillancourt and Grin, 2000).
A person with wealth a can spend at most e = a on education due to the absence of credit
market to nance education.9 The next section analyzes the case in which no one is bound by the
wealth constraint on educational investment, that is, everyone has enough wealth to make optimal
spending. This case would not be relevant to many developing countries in which students must rely
on limited family wealth to pay for study materials, commuting cost, uniforms, and supplementary
education even when public schools do not charge tuitions. Hence, Section 4 examines the general
case in which some people may not have enough wealth for optimal investment. Further, the section
analyzes important issues not present in the unconstrained case.
After spending on education, each person chooses a sector to work and receives earnings, which,
together with remaining wealth (endowment) a  e, are spent on nal goods for consumption.
3 Unconstrained case
This section considers the case in which everyone has enough wealth to make optimal educational
spending. Although this case may not be realistic to many developing countries, it is simpler to
examine than the general case and helpful to understand the analysis of the case in the next section.
3.1 Group 1
First, we examine how group 1 variables are determined. Because group 1s human capital is the
same in the national and local sectors, the wage rates per human capital of the sectors must be
equal. Thus, from (3) and (9),






Hence, the ratio of total human capital of the two sectors is constant:
7The productivity of education for group 1 is normalized to 1 because main results do not depend on it.
8 For analytical tractability, the model abstracts from non-language skill. When non-language skill is also an
input of human capital production functions, the functions should be such that language skill and non-language
skill are complementary, i.e., language skill stimulates development of non-language skill and vice versa; and human
capital is positive even without receiving education of non-language skill, i.e., knowledge and social skill are partly
acquired outside school. A natural extension of the original production functions satisfying these properties is:
h1 = (l+qe)
 [ln+(1 q)e]
n for group 1, h2N = [Nq(1 s)e] [ln+(1 q)e]n and h2L = (l+Lqse) [ln+(1 q)e]n
for group 2, where q 2 [0; 1] is the xed proportion of e allocated to language education; n 2 (0; 1), and ln > 0 is a
constant. As explained in footnote 12 in Section 3, main results would not change under such specication.


















Because endowment (wealth) can alternatively be used for nal good consumption, the income
(net of the cost of education) maximization problem of a group 1 individual is
max
e
fwNh1   P1eg = max
e
fTN (l + e)
   P1eg: (16)
From the rst-order condition,10
TN (l + e)














1    l. (17)



















































1  + l + a: (19)
3.2 Group 2
3.2.1 Individuals choosing the national sector
Now, the determinations of group 2 variables are analyzed. First, consider those who become
national sector workers. Their income maximization problem is
max
e
fwNh2N   P2eg = max
e
fTN [N (1  s)e]
   P2eg: (20)





  P2 = 0:



















10For e > 0 to be optimal, it is assumed that TN and T1 are large enough that TN (l) 1 P1 > 0, (T1)((1 
)TN )
1 (l) 1 > 1 holds.
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Since their human capital is zero without education, e2N > 0 holds; unless s = 1:















3.2.2 Individuals choosing the local sector
Next, consider those who become local sector workers. Their income maximization problem is
max
e
fw2Lh2L   P2eg = max
e
fw2L(l + Lse)
   P2eg: (23)
From the rst-order condition, when Lsw2L(l) 1   P2 > 0; i.e., when positive e is optimal,
Lsw2L(l + Lse)






















































































By contrast, when Lsw2L(l) 1   P2  0; not taking education is optimal, i.e., e2L = 0: In












Since everyone has enough wealth to take optimal education for either sector, individuals are
indi¤erent between the sectors, which implies that net earnings of the two sectors are equal.




































































is determined from the indi¤erence condition, e2N ; e

2L when positive, and P2 are
determined from (21), (24), and (10), respectively.11




































Based on the above analysis, this section examines the following questions: for group 2 individuals,
what is a desirable combination of the two types of education in terms of future earnings and
consumption, and what is a desirable combination in terms of skill development? Because skill,
earnings, and consumption of group 1 individuals are not a¤ected by the education policy of group
2, they are mentioned only in relation to those of group 2 individuals.
The previous subsection shows that educational spending of those who choose the local sector
subsequently is either zero or positive. The next lemma shows whether e2L = 0 or e

2L > 0 depends
on the weight on local language education, s:
Lemma 1 Suppose that all group 2 individuals have enough wealth (endowment) for education and
T2 and TN are not extremely low. Then,
(i) There exist two critical values of s; denoted s; s 2 (0; 1) (s < 1  (1  ) < s); such that those
who choose the local sector do not spend on education, i.e., e2L = 0; for s  s and s  s; while,
for s 2 (s; s); their educational spending is positive, i.e., e2L > 0:
(ii) s (s) decreases (increases) with T2, TN ; N ; and L.
Figure 1 illustrates the result. When the proportion of educational spending allocated to
education useful in the local sector is very low or very high, i.e., for s  s and s  s; those who
choose the local sector subsequently do not spend on education, i.e., e2L = 0; while when the




is determined, H2N , H2L; and the number of workers in each sector, L2N and L2L = L2 L2N ;
are determined from H2N = [N (1   s)e2N ]
L2N and H2L = (l + Lse2L)




















12 When human capital production functions include non-language skill as an input and are given by the equations
in footnote 8 of Section 2, di¤erent from the original specication, when TN ; T2; N ; and L are high, e2L > 0 holds
at s = 0; i.e., s does not exist. This is because the return to educational expenditure on non-language skill does not
depend on s and is positive even at e = 0. However, intuitive explanations of the lemmas (except the result on s)
and the propositions below remain unchanged, hence, main results would not change qualitatively.
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Figure 1: Lemma 1 (i)
The result can be understood from the marginal return to educational investment at e = 0













 1 1.13 When s is very low, the marginal
return is negative, because the marginal e¤ect of educational spending on human capital for the
local sector (Ls(l) 1) is very small, which dominates the sectors high wage rate due to large
H2N
H2L
.14 By contrast, when s is very high, the marginal return is negative, because w2L
P2
becomes very
low due to small H2N
H2L
; which dominates a large marginal e¤ect of e on h2L. Higher productivities
T2, TN and higher e¤ectiveness of education N , L widen the range of s over which educational
investment is rewarding, because the wage rate is higher.15
The result that future local sector workers do not spend on education when s is very low or
very high might appear implausible, since the great majority of students take some education
even in poor countries. The di¤erence from the real economy arises because, for tractability, the
model abstracts from motives for attending school other than the investment motive, including
consumption motives (joys of studying or attending school) and social motives (pleasure of doing
what friends do, pressure from family members or the community to attend school). The result,
however, sheds light on an important source of poor academic performance of students in many
countries. According to the result, students going to the local sector have weak incentive to study
and thus perform badly, either because what they learn is mostly irrelevant to their future jobs in
the local sector (when s is very low) or because their future earnings are low due to decient skill
of workers in the complementary national sector (when s is very high).
Next, the e¤ect of s on net earnings (in unit of the nal good) and consumption of group 2
individuals is examined. The previous subsection shows that these variables of national sector
workers depend negatively on s and H2N
H2L
(equation (30)). How does H2N
H2L
depend on s?






; an increase in s makes the local sector more protable than the national sector:
an increase in s lowers h2N and thus net earnings in the national sector, while it raises h2L and
net earnings in the local sector when e2L > 0 and do not a¤ect these variables when e

2L = 0. By
contrast, given s, a decrease in H2N
H2L
makes the national sector more attractive: a decrease in H2N
H2L
lowers P2 (from a decrease in
Y2N
Y2
) and raises net earnings in the national sector, wN
P2
h2N   e =
13Thereafter, the marginal return to educational investment and net earnings are measured in unit of the nal
good, not in unit of the numeraire, the intermediate good.
14This is because small s leads to large h2N and small h2L. The next lemma, Lemma 2, formally shows that when
s is small, H2N
H2L
is large.
15 Increases in TN and N raise
w2L
P2
, because workers in the local sector and the intermediate good produced in







   e2N ; while it lowers
w2L
P2
and net earnings in the local sector. Hence, when s
increases, H2N
H2L
must decrease for workers to remain indi¤erent between the sectors.
Thus, the direct e¤ect of s on net earnings and consumption of national sector workers is
negative, while the indirect e¤ect through H2N
H2L
is positive. Which e¤ect dominates? The following
lemma examines the total e¤ect when e2L = 0 and when e

2L > 0 separately.
Lemma 3 Suppose that all group 2 individuals have enough wealth for education.
(i)When e2L = 0, earnings net of the cost of education and consumption of group 2 individuals
decrease with s:
(ii)When e2L > 0; if TN ; T2; N , and L are low, net earnings and consumption of group 2
individuals decrease with s; otherwise, they decrease with s for small s; increase with s for
intermediate s; and decrease with s for large s:
When future local sector workers do not spend on education, i.e., e2L = 0; net earnings and
consumption decrease as a greater proportion of educational expenditure is allocated to the devel-





and h2L remains unchanged. Since individuals are indi¤erent between the sectors,
the same is true for net earnings in the national sector and consumption.
By contrast, when e2L > 0; if the sectoral productivities T2, TN and the e¤ectiveness of educa-
tion N ; L are low, net earnings and consumption decrease with the weight on local language educa-
tion; otherwise, the e¤ects of the weight on these variables are non-monotonic: they decrease with
s for small s; increase with s for intermediate s; and decrease with s again for large s: An increase in









and consumption through a decrease in h2N , while it has a positive e¤ect through decreases in
H2N
H2L
and thus P2: If TN ; T2; N ; and L are low or if s is small or large, the former e¤ect dominates
the latter e¤ect and net earnings and consumption decrease with s; otherwise, the latter e¤ect
dominates and they increase with s.
The lemma implicitly assumes that either e2L = 0 holds for any s or e

2L > 0 holds for any s;
which is not true as shown in Lemma 1 (Figure 1). By taking into account how s a¤ects whether
e2L = 0 or e

2L > 0, the next proposition examines the e¤ect of s on net earnings and consumption.
Proposition 1 Suppose that all group 2 individuals have enough wealth for education.
(i) If TN ; T2; N ; and L are low, net earnings and consumption of group 2 individuals decrease
with s for any s and thus they are maximized at s = 0:
(ii) Otherwise, the net earnings and consumption decrease with s for small s and large s;16 and
increase with s for intermediate s. If TN ; T2; N ; and L are su¢ciently high, they are max-
imized at intermediate s; where s maximizing these variables increases with TN ; T2; N ; and
L; otherwise, they are maximized at s = 0.
If the sectoral productivities T2, TN and the productivities of education N ; L are low, net
earnings and consumption of group 2 individuals always decrease with the weight on local language
education and thus they are maximized when educational expenditure is exclusively allocated to
common language education.
Otherwise, their net earnings and consumption decrease with s for small s and large s and
increase with s for intermediate s. If T2, TN ; N ; and L are su¢ciently high, these variables are
maximized at intermediate s; i.e., a balanced allocation of expenditure to mother tongue education
16They decrease with s at least for s  s and s  minf; sg.
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(a) Relatively high TN ; T2; N ; and L (b) Relatively low TN ; T2; N ; and L
Figure 2: Relationship between s and net earnings (in unit of the nal good) when TN , T2, N ,
and L are not low of the unconstrained case (Proposition 1 (ii))
and common language education is economically desirable; otherwise, they are maximized at s = 0.
In other words, in order for bilingual education to be economically benecial to the minority or
subordinate group, the productivities and the e¤ectiveness of education must be su¢ciently high.
Further, s maximizing net earnings and consumption increases with the exogenous variables, i.e.,
as the sectoral productivities and the e¢ciencies of education become higher, the greater emphasis
on mother tongue education becomes desirable. Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between s and
net earnings (in unit of the nal good) for this case, (a) when T2, TN ; N ; and L are relatively
high and (b) when they are relatively low. (Similar gures can be drawn for consumption, which
equals net earnings plus wealth.) In both cases, the shape of the graph is similar and net earnings
are maximized at s = 0 when e2L = 0 and at s = smax when e

2L > 0: However, in (a), the value at
s = smax is higher than the one at s = 0; while the value at s = 0 is higher in (b).
In the real economy, the sectoral productivities and the e¤ectiveness of education of a country
are closely related to the level of economic and social development. Hence, the result implies
that, in general, if the level of development is low, net earnings and consumption are highest
under common-language-only education, otherwise, they are highest under bilingual education.17
Angrist and Lavy (1997) nd that the policy change of the 1980s in Morocco that replaced French
with Arabic as the medium of instruction in post-primary education greatly lowered returns to
schooling.18 Cappellari and Di Paolo (2018) analyze the e¤ects of the 1983 education reform in
Catalonia, which substantially increased the weight on Catalan in mandatory education (from a
very low weight to a slightly higher weight than Spanish), and nd a positive e¤ect on earnings.
17When the model is applied to economies with di¤erent levels of development, it must be consistent with the fact
that a large portion of educational expenditure is used for hiring teachers and thus the unit cost of education increases
with the wage. This can be taken into account by replacing e in human capital production functions with e deated
by the unit cost of education, which increases with wN = TN : As far as the unit cost changes less proportionately to
the wage, which is plausible since non-labor cost is non-negligible, qualitative results remain the same.
18Unlike the model, French is not the ethnic language of any group. However, at that time, French was the
dominant language in many parts of the modern sector, such as public administration, foreign trade, and science
and technology, and children of workers in these areas had a great advantage in acquiring French skills. Hence, the
models result would apply to this environment, if one interprets these children as the dominant group of the model.
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Consistent with the result, these ndings suggest that a large increase in the weight on local
language education lowers wages in a developing country (Morocco) and raises wages in a developed
region (Catalonia).
Even among developing countries, the productivity of primary education is very di¤erent and
explains most of the gap in cross-country test scores (Singh, 2020).19 The theoretical result implies
that if a country has ine¤ective education system, net earnings and consumption are maximized
under common-language-only education, otherwise, they are maximized under bilingual education.
What is crucial for the result is the assumption that human capital for the local sector is positive
without education, i.e., l > 0. If l = 0, irrespective of values of T2, TN N ; and L, e2L > 0 holds for
any positive s; net earnings and consumption are highest at intermediate s = , and they increase
(decrease) with s for smaller (greater) s. The assumption makes education unprotable for future
local sector workers when s is very low or very high and causes net earnings and consumption to
decrease with s for low s, which could lead to these variables being maximized at s = 0.
As mentioned in Introduction, what concerns experts on language and education is how weights
on the two types of education a¤ect skill development of students. Further, empirical evidence
suggests that given income, human capital has positive e¤ects on child-rearing, health, and among
others. Hence, the next proposition examines the e¤ect of s on human capital for the national
sector and the one for the local sector.
Proposition 2 Suppose that all group 2 individuals have enough wealth for education.
(i) h2L is lowest when s  s and s  s; while it is highest at s = 1  (1 ) 2 (s; s) and increases
(decreases) with s for smaller (greater) s 2 (s; s):
(ii) (a) If TN , T2; N ; and L are low, h

2N decreases with s for any s and is maximized at s = 0:
(b) Otherwise, h2N decreases with s for small s and large s and increases with s for intermediate
s.20 If TN , T2; N ; and L are su¢ciently high, h

2N is maximized at intermediate s 2 (s; );
where s maximizing h2N increases with TN , T2; N ; and L; otherwise it is maximized at s = 0.
Human capital for the local sector is lowest when s is small or large enough that e2L = 0, i.e.,
s  s and s  s, and is highest when s is at an intermediate level, i.e., s = 1  (1   ) 2 (s; s):
Figure 3 illustrates the relationship between s and h2L:
In contrast, human capital for the national sector is highest when s is zero or when s is
intermediate, i.e., s 2 (s; ): If TN , T2; N ; and L are low enough, h2N is highest at s = 0;
otherwise it is highest at an intermediate s; where s maximizing h2N increases with TN , T2; N ;
and L, i.e., as the productivities and the e¤ectiveness of education are higher, the greater emphasis
on mother tongue education becomes benecial for development of skill for the national sector. The
relationship between s and h2N is similar to the one between s and net earnings or consumption.
The result implies that balanced allocation of expenditure to common language education and
mother tongue education is crucial for skill development of students who choose the local sector
subsequently. By contrast, common-language-only education maximizes human capital for the
national sector when the productivities and the e¤ectiveness of education are low. However, for
most people working in the national sector, the mother tongue is a major language at home and
thus is important for child-rearing, health, and so forth. That is, the dual education is benecial
for them as well. Hence, the result is mostly consistent with a general consensus among specialists
19Based on panel data of four developing countries with widely di¤ering test scores of primary school students
(Ethiopia, India, Peru, and Vietnam), Singh (2020) shows that most of the di¤erences in the student achievement
are explained by cross-country di¤erences in the productivity of primary education.
20 It decreases with s at least for s  s and s  minf; sg; where  < 1  (1  ) (s maximizing h2L).
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Figure 3: Relationship between s and h2L in the unconstrained case
on language and education that placing emphasis on ethnic language education at least in primary
education is important for skill development (Ball, 2011; Heugh, 2011). It is also consistent with
ndings in economics (Jain, 2017; Ramachandran, 2017) that the signicant introduction of mother
tongue education increases academic skill and years of education.
The result that h2L = (l+ Lse

2L)
 increases (decreases) with s for small (large) s 2 (s; s) can
be explained as follows. An increase in s has a direct positive e¤ect on the human capital and
indirect e¤ects through a change in e2L. Because the marginal return to educational spending at















 1 1= 0; an increase in s a¤ects
e2L positively through the increased marginal e¤ect of e on h2L, while it a¤ects e

2L negatively
through decreases in H2N
H2L
and thus the real wage rate. When s is small (large); the positive e¤ects
dominate (are dominated by) the last negative e¤ect and thus h2L increases (decreases) with s:
Human capital for the national sector, h2N = [(1 s)Ne

2N ]
 , is also a¤ected by s through these
e¤ects, but signs of the e¤ects are opposite from h2L: the direct e¤ect of s on h

2N is negative; as
for indirect e¤ects through e2N ; the e¤ect through a change in the marginal e¤ect of e on h2N is




is positive. If TN , T2; N ; and L
are not low and s is intermediate, the last positive e¤ect dominates the negative e¤ects and h2N
increases with s; otherwise, the negative e¤ects dominate and h2N decreases with s:
Finally, because group 1 individuals are not a¤ected by weights on the two types of education
group 2 students receive, the above results directly apply to inter-group inequalities in skill, net
earnings, and consumption, which is summarized as the following corollary. In order to assure that
group 1 individuals have higher net earning and consumption for given wealth, T1  T2 is assumed.
Corollary 1 Suppose that T1  T2 and all individuals have enough wealth for education.
(i) If TN , T2; N ; and L are small, inter-group inequalities in skill for the national sector, net
earnings, and consumption are lowest at s = 0; but the inequality in skill for the local sector is
highest at s = 0:
(ii) If TN , T2; N ; and L are su¢ciently large, the inter-group inequalities are lowest when s is in
the intermediate range.
When the sectoral productivities and the e¤ectiveness of minority education are low, common-
language-only education attains lowest inter-group inequalities in skill for the national sector (com-
mon language skill), net earnings, and consumption, but it leads to the highest inequality in skill
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for the local sector (mother tongue skill), which is essential skill outside of work for most people.
In contrast, bilingual education brings a lower gap in mother tongue skill but at the cost of higher
gaps in other dimensions. Balanced dual education achieves lowest inter-group inequalities in all
dimensions only when the productivities and the e¤ectiveness of education are su¢ciently large.
4 General case
This section examines the general case in which some people may not have enough wealth to
make optimal educational investment. This case would be relevant to many developing countries
in which students must rely on limited family wealth to pay for study materials, commuting
cost, uniforms, and supplementary education even when public schools do not charge tuitions.
The important di¤erence from the unconstrained case is that individuals choose di¤erent levels of
educational spending and di¤erent sectors depending on their wealth. First, the section examines
how the distribution of wealth a¤ects net earnings and consumption of individuals and intra-group
inequalities. Then, as the previous section, the section examines the e¤ect of the weight on the two
types of education the minority receive on their human capital, net earnings, consumption, and
inter-group inequalities. Let the distribution function of wealth (endowment) of group 2 individuals
be F (a); which is di¤erentiable for a > 0 and allows a mass at a = 0; i.e., F (0) > 0:21
4.1 Group 1
Because group 1s human capital is same in both sectors, as in the previous section, the wage rates
per human capital of the two sectors are equated and everyone is indi¤erent between the sectors.
What is di¤erent from the unconstrained case is that those who have wealth a < e1 cannot make
optimal investment, i.e., e = a < e1; and thus net earnings di¤er among individuals with di¤erent
wealth (except among individuals with a  e1): As shown in Appendix A, levels of net earnings
and consumption of group 1 individuals do not depend on the distribution of wealth.
4.2 Group 2
Unlike group 1, the fact that the group 2s human capital production functions are asymmetric
without education, human capital for the national sector is zero but human capital for the local
sector is positiveimplies that only individuals with particular level(s) of wealth are indi¤erent
between the sectors. Individuals who have greater wealth and thus spend more on education than
those who are indi¤erent between the sectors have a comparative advantage in the national sector
and choose the sector, and individuals with smaller wealth choose the local sector.
To be more accurate, depending on whether e2L = 0 or e

2L > 0 and the level(s) of wealth at
which the indi¤erence condition holds, ve qualitatively distinctive cases could be realized. Figure
4 illustrates how educational and sectoral choices depend on wealth for each case.
As shown in the gure, in Cases 1 and 2, e2L = 0 holds and thus those who strictly prefer the
local sector, i.e., those with a < e2N in Case 1 and those with a < ba0(< e2N ) in Case 2, do not
spend on education, i.e., e = e2L = 0: In Case 1, those with a  e

2N are indi¤erent between the
sectors and those who choose the national (local) sector spend e = e2N (e = 0); in Case 2, those
with a > ba0 strictly prefer the national sector and spend e = a if a < e2N and e = e2N otherwise.
In Cases 3, 4, and 5, e2L > 0 holds and thus those who strictly prefer the local sector, i.e.,
those with a<e2N in Case 3, those with a < ba 2 [e2L; e2N ) in Case 4, and those with a < ea(< e2L)
in Case 5, choose positive e. (e2N > e

2L is proved in Appendix B.) In Cases 3 and 4, they spend
21As shown just below, individual outcomes of group 1 do not depend on the distribution of wealth.
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Figure 4: Dependence of educational and sectoral choices of group 2 individuals on wealth
e = a if a < e2L and e = e

2L otherwise, while in Case 5, they spend e = a. As for those with
wealth greater than the threshold, in Case 3, they are indi¤erent between the sectors and those
who choose the national (local) sector spend e = e2N (e = e

2L); in Cases 4 and 5, they strictly
prefer the national sector and spend e = a if a < e2N and e = e

2N otherwise.
Appendix A explains how the threshold level of wealth and other endogenous variables such as
H2N
H2L
; net earnings, and consumption are determined in each case.
4.3 Results
Under what conditions is each of the ve cases realized? The next lemma shows that it depends
on the distribution of wealth and the weight on local language education. Proofs of lemmas and
propositions of the general case are contained in Web Appendix C.
Lemma 4 (i)When s  s or s  s, e2L = 0: If the proportion of group 2 individuals with adequate
wealth is relatively high (low), i.e., when F (a) is relatively low (high) for given a, Case 1 (Case
2) is realized: the indi¤erence condition holds for individuals with a  e2N (a = ba0 < e2N ).
(ii)When s 2 (s; s), as the proportion of those with adequate wealth becomes lower, the realized
equilibrium changes in the following order.22
22Given the distribution of wealth, Case 2 is realized when s is relatively low and high. (As shown in Figure 5, when
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Figure 5: Wealth distribution and realized cases (Lemma 4)
(a) Case 3: e2L > 0 and the indi¤erence condition holds for individuals with a  e

2N :
(b) Case 4: e2L > 0 and the indi¤erence condition holds for individuals with a = ba 2 [e2L; e2N ):
(c) Case 5, except when s is close to s or s: e2L > 0 and the indi¤erence condition holds for
individuals with a = ea < e2L:
(d) Case 2: e2L = 0 and the indi¤erence condition holds for individuals with a = ba0 < e2N :
Figure 5 illustrates the lemma. When s  s or s  s, e2L = 0 and thus Case 1 or Case 2
is realized. Given s, Case 1 (Case 2) is realized when the proportion of group 2 individuals with
adequate wealth is relatively high (low); i.e., when cumulative distribution F (a) is relatively low
(high) for given a.23 When s 2 (s; s), all the cases except Case 1 could be realized. Given s,
as the proportion of individuals with adequate wealth becomes lower; i.e., as F (a) for given a
becomes higher, the realized equilibrium changes in the following order: Case 3, Case 4, Case 5
(except when s is close to s or s), and Case 2.24 Note that the unconstrained case examined in
the proportion of those with adequate wealth is extremely low, Case 2 is realized for any s.). To be more precise,
when s 2 (s; s); Case 2 is realized at least for s 2 (s; s(F )) and for s 2 (s(F ); s); where s(F ) (s(F )) is critical s below
(above) which e2L = 0 holds and s(F ) increases (s(F ) decreases) as the proportion of those with adequate wealth
falls. (It is not analytically clear if other critical values exist between s(F ) and s(F ), but numerical simulations with
truncated lognormal distributions suggest other thresholds do not exist.) Case 5 does not exist when s is close to s
or s: as shown in Figure 5, while the dividing line between Case 3 and Case 4 and the one between Case 1 and Case
2 intersect at s = s; s; the one between Case 4 and Case 5 does not intersect with them:
23The proof of the proposition also shows that, as illustrated in the gure, given the distribution of wealth, Case 2
(Case 1) is realized when s is low (high), and, as the proportion falls, the region of Case 2 (Case 1) expands (shrinks).
24Shapes of the dividing line between Case 3 and Case 4, the one between Case 4 and Case 5, and ones between
Case 2 and Cases 4 and 5 might be di¤erent from the gure, although the results below do not depend on shapes of
these lines. What is proved analytically about these lines is contained in the lemma and the footnote attached to it.
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the previous section is a special case of Cases 1 and 3, where everyone has enough wealth to make
optimal investment, i.e., a  e2N > e

2L holds for everyone.
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4.3.1 E¤ects of the distribution of wealth
As noted above, the distribution of wealth does not a¤ect net earnings and consumption of group
1 individuals with given levels of wealth. How about group 2 individuals? Since their net earnings
and consumption depend on H2N
H2L




(i) If the proportion of group 2 individuals with adequate wealth is high enough (F (a) for given a
is low enough) that Case 1 or Case 3 is realized; a change in the proportion of such individuals
does not a¤ect H2N
H2L
.
(ii) Otherwise, as the proportion of those with adequate wealth is lower, H2N
H2L
becomes smaller.
If the proportion of the minority with adequate wealth is high enough (F (a) for given a is low
enough) that Cases 1 or 3 is realized; as with the majority, the distribution of wealth does not a¤ect
H2N
H2L
: As the proportion of such individuals becomes lower, a smaller fraction of individuals can
nancially access the national sector. However, a higher proportion of them, who are indi¤erent
between the sectors, come to choose the sector (footnote 26), which keeps H2N
H2L
unchanged.
By contrast, if the proportion of those with adequate wealth is not high and thus Cases 2, 4, or
5 is realized, as the proportion of such individuals is lower, H2N
H2L
becomes smaller. In these cases,
those with relatively large wealth uniformly choose the national sector. Hence, a decline in the
fraction of people accessible to the national sector leads to a fall in H2N
H2L
; although a decrease in the
threshold wealth satisfying the indi¤erence condition (footnote 26) mitigates the decrease of H2N
H2L
.
The result that the distribution of wealth a¤ects H2N
H2L
in Cases 2, 4, and 5 implies that net
earnings, consumption, and human capital of group 2 individuals are inuenced by the distribution
in these cases. The next proposition shows how the distribution of wealth a¤ects these variables
and their inequalities between national and local sector workers.
Proposition 3 Suppose that the proportion of group 2 individuals with adequate wealth falls.
(i) If the proportion of those with adequate wealth is high enough that Cases 1 or 3 is realized; as
with to group 1, net earnings, consumption, and human capital of individuals with given wealth
do not change. The change in the proportion a¤ects inequalities in these variables only directly.
(ii) Otherwise, net earnings and consumption of those who have relatively large (small) wealth
and thus choose the national (local) sector increase (decrease): The decreased proportion raises
earnings and consumption disparities between any pairs of national and local sector workers
with given levels of wealth.
25Which case is realized also depends on sectoral productivities TN ; T2 and the e¤ectiveness of education N ; L:
When s is low or high enough that e2L = 0; it can be proved that Case 1 (Case 2) is realized when these variables
are relatively low (high). When s is intermediate and thus e2L > 0; analytical results are not obtained but numerical
simulations suggest that as levels of these variables increase, the realized case changes from Case 3 rst to Case 4,
then to Case 5. Intuitively, given wealth distribution, higher values of TN ; T2; N ; or L make educational investment
more protable and raise e2N and e

2L; thus a lower proportion of individuals make optimal investment.
26The proof of the lemma also shows that, as the proportion of those with adequate wealth becomes lower, a higher
fraction of those with a  e2N ; who are indi¤erent between the sectors, choose the national sector in (i), while the
threshold wealth satisfying the indi¤erence condition becomes smaller in (ii).
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If the proportion of minority individuals with adequate wealth is high enough that Cases 1
or 3 is realized, as with the majority, a change in the proportion does not a¤ect H2N
H2L
: Thus, net
earnings, consumption, and human capital of individuals with given wealth do not change. The
change in wealth distribution a¤ects distributions of these variables only directly.
By contrast, if the proportion of such individuals is not high, a decrease in the proportion
lowers H2N
H2L




). As a result, given levels of wealth, net earnings
and consumption of those who have relatively large (small) wealth and choose the national (local)
sector increase (decrease), and earnings and consumption disparities between any pairs of national
and local sector workers rise. [h2N (h2L) of those who make optimal investment e2N (e

2L) increases
(decreases) and thus the gap in human capital also rises for some of the pairs.] Hence, a change
in the distribution of wealth a¤ects distributions of net earnings, consumption, and human capital
not only directly but also indirectly through changes in these variables for given wealth.
This result has implications for within-group inequalities in net earnings and consumption of
the two groups. While inequality in wealth of dominant group 1 a¤ects inequalities in net earnings
and consumption only directly, inequality in wealth of subordinate group 2 have both direct and
indirect e¤ects on the within-group inequalities, as long as the proportion of those with adequate
wealth is not high. Hence, a given rise in wealth inequality tends to raise earnings and consumption
inequalities of group 2 more than the inequalities of group 1.27
Why does the indirect e¤ect exist only for group 2? Unlike the majority, education is a pre-
requisite for the minority to work in the national sector that requires the skill to use a non-native
language to them. As a result, the national sector is "ranked" higher than the local sector only
for the minority: group 2 individuals with relatively large wealth for education go to the national
sector and those with limited wealth go to the local sector, while the two sectors are indi¤erent to
group 1. A change in wealth distribution alters the proportion of those who can take education
su¢cient for the national sector and thus H2N
H2L
; wage rates, net earnings and consumption, unless
the proportion of such individuals is more than enough for national sector jobs.
4.3.2 E¤ects of the weight on mother tongue education
The remaining part of the subsection examines the question analyzed in the previous section: for
group 2 individuals, what is a desirable combination of the two types of education in terms of future
net earnings and consumption, and what is a desirable combination in terms of skill development?
The important di¤erence from the unconstrained case is that individuals choose di¤erent levels
of educational spending and di¤erent sectors depending on their wealth. Hence, answers to the
question could di¤er among individuals with di¤erent wealth.
The next lemma shows that H2N
H2L




Hence, an increase in s has a positive (negative) direct e¤ect on net earnings and consumption
of local (national) sector workers through human capital, while it has a negative (positive) indirect
e¤ect through a fall in H2N
H2L
and thus a decrease in w2L
P2
(an increase in w2N
P2
).
The next lemma examines the total e¤ect on net earnings and consumption when e2L = 0 and
when e2L > 0 separately.
Lemma 7 (i) Suppose e2L = 0: Then, net earnings and consumption of any group 2 individual
decrease with s:
27This claim cannot be proved analytically, but numerical simulations suggest that this is the case.
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(ii) Suppose e2L > 0:
(a) If TN , T2; N ; and L are low, the result is same as (i):
28
(b) Otherwise, net earnings and consumption of individuals with very small wealth; who choose
the local sector, decrease with s; and those of other individuals decrease with s for large s: If
TN , T2; N ; and L are su¢ciently high, these variables of individuals with relatively large
wealth increase with s over some ranges of s.29
As with the unconstrained case, net earnings and consumption of the minority decrease with
s when e2L = 0 and when e

2L > 0 and TN , T2; N ; and L are low. By contrast, when e

2L > 0
and TN , T2; N ; and L are not low, the result is di¤erent depending on wealth. Net earnings and
consumption of those with very small wealth decrease with s for any s: As for those with greater
wealth, these variables decrease with s for large s, and if TN , T2; N ; and L are su¢ciently high,
the variables of those with relatively large wealth increase with s over some ranges of s:
The result for those with very small wealth, who choose the local sector, can be explained as
follows. An increase in s has a positive direct e¤ect on net earnings and consumption of local sector






positive direct e¤ect increases with wealth; because an individual with greater wealth spends more
on education and thus benets more from the increased weight on mother tongue education. When
she has little wealth to spend on education, the positive e¤ect is small and is dominated by the
negative e¤ect for any s, thus net earnings and consumption always decrease with s:
Based on the lemma, the next proposition examines the e¤ect of s on net earnings and con-
sumption by taking into account how s a¤ects whether e2L = 0 or e

2L > 0. Thereafter, it is
assumed that l is not very large compared to wealth levels of most individuals:30
Proposition 4
(i) If TN , T2; N ; and L are low or if the proportion of those with adequate wealth is very low, net
earnings and consumption of any group 2 individual decrease with s and are highest at s = 0:
(ii) Otherwise, these variables decrease with s for small s and large s:
(a) If TN , T2; N ; and L are su¢ciently high, net earnings and consumption of those with
relatively large wealth increase with s over some ranges of intermediate s. Further, if TN , T2;
N ; and L are high enough, these variables are highest at intermediate s; where s maximizing
the variables of local sector workers weakly increases with a.
(b) Net earnings and consumption of those with very small wealth; who choose the local sector,
decrease with s and are highest at s = 0:
As in the unconstrained case, if TN , T2; N ; and L are low, net earnings and consumption of
the minority decrease with s and are highest at s = 0. This is also the case if the proportion of
those with adequate wealth is very low and thus Case 2 is realized for any s (Figure 5).
28As for those who have relatively large wealth and thus choose the national sector in Case 4, the result is proved
analytically only for large s; but numerical simulations suggest that the result holds for any s:
29 In Cases 4 and 5, the result is not proved analytically for those who choose the local sector and for L; but
numerical exercises suggest that the result holds for these workers with relatively large a and for high enough L:
30The assumption is needed to prove the existence of intermediate s maximizing net earnings and consumption
in (ii)(a) of the next proposition and intermediate s maximizing h2N in (ii)(a) of Proposition 5 below. Numerical
simulations suggest that, when a
l
is low for many individuals and L is small; irrespective of levels of TN , T2; and
N ; net earnings and consumption (or h2N ) of any individual decrease with s and thus they are highest at s = 0. In
contrast, if L is su¢ciently large, these variables are highest at intermediate s even when al is low for many.
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(a) Relatively high TN , T2; N ; and L (b) Relatively low TN , T2; N ; and L
Figure 6: Numerical example of the relationship between s and net earnings (in unit of the nal
good) (Proposition 4)
Otherwise, the result is di¤erent depending on wealth. Net earnings and consumption of those
with very small wealth; who choose the local sector, decrease with s and are maximized under
common-language-only education: These variables of those with greater wealth decrease with s for
small s and large s (at least when e2L = 0); while for intermediate s; the relationship with s is
not analytically clear: However, as for those with relatively large wealth, it can be proved that the
variables increase with s over some range of intermediate s; if TN , T2; N ; and L are su¢ciently
high. Further, if the exogenous variables are high enough, their net earnings and consumption are
highest at intermediate s: In such case, s maximizing the variables of local sector workers weakly
increases with their wealth. That is, as their wealth is higher, a greater weight on mother tongue
education is economically optimal. This is because an individual with greater wealth spends more
on education and thus benets more from the increased emphasis on local language education.
Since the sectoral productivities and the e¤ectiveness of education of a country are closely
related to the degree of development, the result implies that, in general, if the level of development
is low, net earnings and consumption are maximized under common-language-only education; while
if the level of development is su¢ciently high, they are maximized under bilingual education except
for the very poor. As mentioned in the previous section, this is consistent with empirical ndings
(Angrist and Lavy, 1997; Cappellari and Di Paolo, 2018). The di¤erence in the productivity of
education is very large even among developing countries (Singh, 2020). The result implies that
if a country has ine¤ective education system, common-language-only education is economically
optimal, otherwise, bilingual education is optimal except for the very poor.
Figure 6 presents a numerical example of the relationship between s and net earnings of those
whose wealth is very large, large, small, and very small, (a) when TN , T2; N ; and L are relatively
high and (b) when they are relatively low. Net earnings of those with very small a decrease with
s; while, as in the unconstrained case (with not very low TN , T2; N ; and L), net earnings of the
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Figure 7: Relationship between wealth and s maximizing net earnings and consumption of local
sector workers (Proposition 4 (ii))
other individuals decrease with s for small s and large s; and increase with s for intermediate s.
Their net earnings are highest at intermediate s in (a) and at s = 0 in (b).31
Figure 7 illustrates the relationship between wealth and s maximizing net earnings and con-
sumption of local sector workers, which is represented by a thick solid line, when TN , T2; N ;
and L are high enough:32 sD is s maximizing these variables when educational spending is not
constrained by wealth. When a  aD, individuals can make optimal investment e = e2L at s = sD
and thus the variables are maximized at s = sD: When a 2 [aC ; aD) and thus e = e2L cannot
be chosen at s = sD; e = a < e2L and s maximizing the variables increases with wealth. When
a < aC ; the variables are maximized at s = 0 and e = e2L = 0:
The next proposition examines the e¤ect of s on human capital for the national sector and
human capital for the local sector.
Proposition 5
(i) (a) If the proportion of those with enough wealth is very low, e2L = 0 and h2L = (l)
 for any s:
(b) Otherwise, h2L is highest at intermediate s, where s maximizing h2L weakly decreases with a.
(ii) (a) If TN , T2; N ; and L are low or if the proportion of those with adequate wealth is very
low, h2N decreases with s and is maximized at s = 0:
(b) Otherwise, h2N of those with relatively small wealth decreases with s and is maximized at s = 0:
h2N of those with greater wealth decreases with s when s is very low or very high (at least when
e2L = 0). Their human capital is maximized at s = 0 if TN , T2; N ; and L are su¢ciently
low; otherwise, it is highest at intermediate s; where optimal s weakly increases with a.
As in the unconstrained case, human capital for the local sector is highest at intermediate s,
unless the proportion of those with adequate wealth for education is very low and thus Case 2 is
realized for any s (Figure 5), in which case e2L = 0 and thus h2L is at the lowest level for any
s: s maximizing h2L weakly decreases with a: That is, as their wealth increases, a smaller weight
on mother tongue education becomes optimal in terms of skill development, which is the opposite
from the result on net earnings and consumption of the previous proposition.
31 In both (a) and (b),  = 0:5;  = 0:45; l = 90; the distribution of wealth follows truncated log normal with
maximum 200, mean 20 and variance 80, and a = 100; 30; 15; and 1 for the four types of individuals. In (a),
TN = T2 = 30; N = 15; and L = 25; while in (b), TN = T2 = 15; N = 10; and L = 20: In the example, those
with a = 100 and 30 choose the national sector for any s and those with smaller a choose the local sector for any s
(except s very close to 1 for those with a = 15).
32sD is located in the region in which e2L increases with s: As in the gure, one cannot rule out the possibility
that there exist multiple values of s maximizing e2L locally, although simulations suggest that such s is unique.
23
(a) Human capital for the local sector (b) Human capital for the national sector
when TN , T2; N ; and L are high enough
Figure 8: Relationship between s and human capital for each sector (Proposition 5)
As for human capital for the national sector, as in the unconstrained case, if TN , T2; N ; and
L are low, it decreases with s and is maximized at s = 0: This is also the case if the proportion
of individuals with adequate wealth is very low. Otherwise, the result depends on wealth. Human
capital of those with relatively small wealth decreases with s and is maximized at s = 0: As for those
with greater wealth, if TN , T2; N ; and L are su¢ciently low, h2N is highest at s = 0; otherwise,
h2N is highest at intermediate s; where s maximizing the human capital weakly increases with a.
That is, as their wealth increases, a greater weight on mother tongue education becomes desirable
for skill development, which is the opposite from the result on human capital for the local sector.
Figure 8 (a) illustrates the relationship between wealth and s maximizing human capital for
the local sector:33 sE is s maximizing h2L when educational spending is not constrained by wealth.
When a  aE , individuals make optimal investment e = e2L at s = sE and thus h2L is maximized
at s = sE : When a < aE and thus e = e2L cannot be chosen at s = sE ; s maximizing h2L is on a
portion of the thick solid curve (a segment of the e2L prole) below the wealth level, which implies
that such s weakly decreases with a.34
Figure 8 (b) illustrates the relationship between wealth and s maximizing human capital for
the national sector, when TN , T2; N ; and L are high enough.35 sF is s maximizing h2N when
educational spending is not constrained by wealth, which is optimal when a  aF . When a 2
[a0; aF ) and thus e = e2N cannot be chosen at s = sF ; s maximizing h2N is on a portion of the
thick solid curve (a segment of the e2N prole) below the wealth level, which implies that such s
weakly increases with a. When a < a0; s = 0 maximizes h2N :36
33As illustrated in the gure, it can be shown that sE is located in the region in which e2L decreases with s: As in
the gure, one cannot rule out the possibility that there exist multiple values of s maximizing e2L locally, although
numerical simulations suggest that such s is unique. The same is true for e2N .
34This result can be explained as follows. Given e = a, increasing s raises h2L = (l + Lse) as long as e < e2L
holds, which implies that h2L is maximized at highest s satisfying e = e2L: As e = a becomes greater, the range of
s satisfying e < e2L shrinks and thus highest s satisfying e = e

2L decreases (see the gure). Hence, the optimal s
becomes weakly smaller. ("weakly" is because h2L might be maximized at highest s satisfying e = e2L < a:)
35As illustrated in the gure, it can be shown that e2N decreases with s when s is small and large (at least when
e2L = 0), and sF is located in a region in which e

2N increases with s:
36The result for a 2 [a0; aF ) can be explained similarly to the corresponding result for h2L: given e = a, decreasing
s raises h2N = [N (1  s)e] , as long as e < e2N holds; as e = a becomes greater, the range of s satisfying e < e

2N
shrinks and thus the optimal s becomes weakly greater.
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The result implies that balanced bilingual education is crucial for skill development of those
who go to the local sector subsequently, unless the proportion of those with adequate wealth is
very low. By contrast, common-language-only education maximizes human capital for the national
sector if an individual has relatively small wealth, if TN , T2; N ; and L are low, or if the proportion
of those with enough wealth is very low. However, for most national sector workers, the mother
tongue is a major language at home and thus is important for health, child-rearing, and so forth.
Hence, it would be fair to say that the dual education is benecial for them as well.
Finally, based on the propositions, the following corollary presents the result on inter-group
inequalities in human capital, net earnings, and consumption.
Corollary 2 Suppose that T1  T2.
(i) If TN , T2; N ; and L are low or if the proportion of individuals with adequate wealth is very low,
inter-group inequalities in human capital for the national sector, net earnings, and consumption
are lowest but the inequality in human capital for the local sector is highest at s = 0:
(ii) Otherwise, if TN , T2; N ; and L are su¢ciently high, the inter-group inequalities are lowest
when s is in the intermediate range, except inequalities in net earnings and consumption of the
very poor and in human capital for the national sector of those with relatively small wealth,
which are lowest at s = 0.
If TN , T2; N ; and L are low or if the proportion of those with adequate wealth is very low,
exclusively common language education minimizes inter-group inequalities in net earnings, con-
sumption, and human capital for the national sector, but it maximizes the inequality in human
capital for the local sector. Otherwise, if the sectoral productivities and the e¤ectiveness of ed-
ucation are su¢ciently high, balanced allocation of the educational budget to the two types of
education minimizes inter-group inequalities in most dimensions, but the inequalities in net earn-
ings and consumption of the very poor and in human capital for the national sector of those with
relatively small wealth are lowest under common-language-only education.
5 Policy Implications
5.1 Implications for language education
The result suggests that balanced bilingual education is important of skill development of minority
individuals: Proposition 5 shows that it is crucial for those who go to the local sector;37 while the
proposition shows that common-language-only education maximizes human capital for the national
sector under certain conditions, considering that mother tongue skill is important for child-rearing,
health, and so on for most national sector workers, the dual education is benecial for them too.
This is mostly consistent with a general consensus among specialists on language and education
(Ball, 2011; Heugh, 2011) and ndings in economics (Jain, 2017; Ramachandran, 2017).
In contrast, according to Proposition 4, while dual education maximizes net earnings and
consumption of most minority people when sectoral productivities and the e¤ectiveness of education
are su¢ciently high, common-language-only education always maximizes these variables of the very
poor and when the productivities and the e¤ectiveness of education are low (or when the proportion
of those with adequate wealth is very low), maximizes the variables of everyone. The result implies
that, in general, when the level of development of a country is low, net earnings and consumption
are highest under common-language-only education; when the level of development is su¢ciently
37As shown in the proposition, the optimal weight on the two types of education di¤ers depending on individual
wealth. The same is true for the result on net earnings and consumption below.
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high, they are highest under bilingual education except for the very poor, which is consistent with
empirical ndings (Angrist and Lavy, 1997; Cappellari and Di Paolo, 2018).
These results suggest that policies that bring good educational and economic outcomes to every
minority individual di¤ers depending on conditions or the level of development of the country.
When the conditions are favorable (the e¤ectiveness of education and the sectoral productivities
are su¢ciently high, and the proportion of those with adequate wealth is not very low), which is
likely to the case when the countrys level of development is not low, the government should imple-
ment bilingual education together with redistributive policies that support educational investment
of individuals with little wealth, such as income transfers, tuition subsidy, and education loans.38
Without the latter policies, the very poor lose economically from the implementation of the dual
education, because they cannot spend su¢ciently enough on education to benet from it.
By contrast, when the country has unfavorable conditions, which is likely to be true when the
level of development is low, bilingual education is better than common-language-only education
in terms of skill development, but is worse in terms of consumption. Considering that mother
tongue skill, which is important at home even for most national sector workers, is lowest under
common-language-only education, ideally, what the government should conduct in the rst place
is policies changing the adverse conditions: improving sectoral productivities and the e¤ectiveness
of education. If these policies are conducted on a su¢cient scale, the dual education coupled with
redistribution towards the very poor can bring good outcomes to all.
The government, however, may not be able to implement these policies on a su¢cient scale
for budgetary or other reasons. If this is the case, the government faces a di¢cult choice between
consumption and skill development. If the government highly prioritizes the economic outcome,
common-language-only education might be conducted at the expense of mother tongue skill; oth-
erwise, bilingual education might be conducted at the cost of consumption.
The propositions also imply that introducing mother tongue education on a small scale, i.e.,
s small enough that e2L = 0 holds, is denitely worse than common-language-only education: it
does not improve mother tongue skill and lowers common language skill and consumption of all.
The range of s satisfying e2L = 0 is wide when conditions of the country are not good, which is
shown for the unconstrained case in Lemma 1.39 This implies that, if the government introduces
bilingual education under the unfavorable conditions, the weight on mother tongue education must
be su¢ciently high, although, as mentioned above, such policy costs consumption.
Note that the model does not take into account several important e¤ects of the choice of
language in education. Mother tongue education would raise ethnic language skill and contribute
to the accumulation of social capital in the local ethnic community. It might also stimulate political
participation and increase support for democracy (Albaugh, 2016). Common language education,
on the other hand, would help people identify with the nation and contribute to national unity and
stability. It might also reduce linguistic diversity and promote public goods provision and economic
growth (Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín, and Wacziarg, 2012). Policy implementation in the actual society
needs to take into account these e¤ects as well as the e¤ects considered in the model.
38Of course, given weights on the two types of education (given s), redistribution toward wealth constrained indi-
viduals would be desirable, because the policies raise their and aggregate consumption. Rather, what the statement
in the main text asserts is that redistribution of a su¢cient scale toward the very poor is needed to implement the
dual education (to choose intermediate s).
39As for the general case, this is shown for the condition on the proportion of those with adequate wealth in
footnote 22 attached to Lemma 4 (Figure 5) and can be shown for other conditions using the equation in the proof
of Lemma 1, and Lemmas A1 and A2 in the proof of Lemma 7.
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5.2 Implications for between-group and within-group inequalities
Since the education policy of the minority does not a¤ect educational and economic outcomes of
the majority, the above results have direct implications for inter-group inequalities in skill and
consumption. That is, if conditions of the country are favorable or the level of development is
not low, dual education coupled with redistributive policies towards the very poor can reduce the
inequalities; otherwise, unfavorable conditions must be changed to reduce the gap in consumption.
When the conditions cannot be improved su¢ciently, bilingual education brings a smaller gap in
skill but a greater gap in consumption than common-language-only education.
Proposition 3 has implications for within-group inequalities in net earnings and consumption.
While inequality in wealth of dominant group 1 a¤ects inequalities in these variables only directly,
inequality in wealth of subordinate group 2 have both direct and indirect e¤ects on the within-group
inequalities, as long as the proportion of those with adequate wealth is not high. Thus, a given
rise in wealth inequality tends to cause greater increases in earnings and consumption inequalities
of group 2 than the inequalities of group 1.
Hence, redistributive policies that increase access to education of the poor would be more
important for group 2 than for group 1: redistribution towards the minority not only lowers inter-
group inequalities in skill and consumption but also is more e¤ective in reducing the within-group
inequalities.
6 Conclusion
Poor economic performance of minority (or subordinate) groups and large economic disparity
between these groups and the majority (or dominant) group are major concerns in most countries.
The mother tongue of the latter group is the common language in many of these countries. How
much weights should be placed on common language education and on ethnic language education
is a crucial issue in school education of minority students.
This paper has developed a model to study the issue theoretically. In particular, it has analyzed
how weights on the two types of education a¤ect skill, earnings, consumption, and their inter-group
inequalities. It also has examined implications of the asymmetric language positions of the groups
for sectoral choices and the within-group inequalities. Main results are summarized as follows.
First, regarding skill development of the minority, balanced bilingual education is desirable: it
is crucial for those with limited wealth; as for those with greater wealth, common-language-only
education could maximize common language skill used in their jobs under certain conditions, but,
considering that mother tongue skill is important for o¤-the-job activities such as child-rearing,
the dual education is benecial for them too.
Second, regarding earnings net of educational expenditure and consumption of the minority,
balanced dual education is desirable only when the country has favorable conditions (i.e., sectoral
productivities and the e¤ectiveness of education are su¢ciently high, and the proportion of those
with adequate wealth for education is not very low) and only for those with su¢cient wealth.
Common-language-only education is always optimal for those with little wealth and, when the
countrys conditions are bad, it is optimal for all. In the real economy, the conditions are closely
related to the level of development of the country. Thus, the result suggests that, in general, if the
level of development is low, common-language-only education is desirable in terms of the economic
outcomes, otherwise, balanced bilingual education is desirable except for the very poor.
Third, because the majority are not a¤ected by weights on the two types of education the
minority receive, the above results directly apply to inter-group inequalities in skill, net earnings,
and consumption. For example, switching from exclusively common language education to balanced
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dual education is able to curtail the inter-group inequalities in earnings and consumption (except
at the bottom of the distributions) only when the country has favorable conditions.
The results imply that policies that bring good educational and economic outcomes to every mi-
nority individual and reduce the inter-group inequalities di¤er depending on the above-mentioned
conditions of the country. If the conditions are favorable, the government should implement bal-
anced bilingual education together with redistributive policies that support educational investment
of those with little wealth. Otherwise, it should rst conduct policies changing the adverse con-
ditions: improving the productivities and the e¤ectiveness of education. If these policies are
conducted on a su¢cient scale, dual education coupled with redistribution towards the very poor
can bring good outcomes to all. On the other hand, if the government cannot implement these
policies on a su¢cient scale, it faces a di¢cult choice between educational and economic outcomes.
Finally, a change in within-group wealth inequality tends to have greater e¤ects on earnings
and consumption inequalities of the minority than the inequalities of the majority. This result
suggests that redistributive policies that increase access to education of the poor would be more
important for the minorty than for the majority.
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Appendix A Determination of endogenous variables in the general
case
Group 1
For group 1 individuals with a  e1; consumption is (19) as before, while, for individuals with
a < e1; from (16) and (15), net earnings in unit of the intermediate good equal

















Net earnings in unit of the nal good equal consumption minus wealth.
Group 2
Net earnings in unit of the nal good equal consumption minus wealth.
(I) When e2L = 0
Case 1: Indi¤erence condition holds for a  e2N : When e

2L = 0 and those with a  e

2N are
indi¤erent between choosing the national sector by expending e = e2N on education and choosing
the local sector by expending e = e2L = 0, the indi¤erence condition is (27), same as when everyone
has enough wealth for education and e2L = 0. Because those with a < e

2N expend e = 0 and
choose the local sector, H2N =[N (1 s)e2N ]
p2N (1 F (e

2N ))L2 (L2 is the group 2 population) and
H2L= (l)




2N )]L2; where p2N is the proportion of those with a  e

2N
















where e2N is given by (21).
Once H2N
H2L
is determined from (28), this equation determines p2N : Since e = e2L = 0 for any
individual choosing the local sector; as in the unconstrained case, c2 for any a is given by (30).
Case 2: Indi¤erence condition holds for a = ba0 < e2N : When e2L = 0 and those with
a = ba0 < e2N are indi¤erent between choosing the national sector by expending e = ba0 and

















Since those with a > ba0 expend e = minfa; e2Ng and choose the national sector, and those with



























where e2N is given by (21).
H2N
H2L
and ba0 are obtained by solving (A4) and (A5), which implies that, unlike the previous case,
H2N
H2L
(and thus individual net earnings and consumption) depends on the distribution of wealth.






























(II) When e2L > 0
Case 3: Indi¤erence condition holds for ae2N : When e

2L>0 and those with ae

2N are in-
di¤erent between choosing the national sector by spending e=e2N and choosing the local sector by
spending e=e2L, the indi¤erence condition is (29), same as the unconstrained case. Since those with
a<e2N spend e=minfa;e

2Lg and choose the local sector,












































where e2N and e

2L are given by (21) and (24), respectively.
Once H2N
H2L
is determined from (29), the above equation determines p2N :
c2 for a  e2L is given by (30) from (29), while c2 for a < e















Case 4: Indi¤erence condition holds for a = ba 2 [e2L; e2N ): When those with a = ba 2
[e2L; e

2N ) are indi¤erent between choosing the national sector with e = ba and choosing the local
sector with e = e2L > 0, the indi¤erence condition is, from (20), (10), and (25),
40This is obvious for a 2 [e2L; e

2N ): The result for a < e

2L can be proved as follows. Since w2Lh2L   P2a >
wNh2N   P2a , w2L(l + Lsa)
 > wN (N (1   s)a)
 holds for those with a = 0 and with a = e2L; if there exist
ranges of a 2 (0; e2L) over which w2Lh2L   P2a < wNh2N   P2a is true; there must exist at least two values of a


































Since those with a > ba choose e = minfa; e2Ng and the national sector and those with a < ba








































where e2N and e

2L are given by (21) and (24), respectively.
H2N
H2L
and ba are obtained by solving (A10) and (A11), which implies that, unlike the previous
case, H2N
H2L
(and thus individual net earnings and consumption) depends on the distribution of
wealth.
c2 for a  e2N is given by (30), c2 for a 2 [ba; e2N ) is given by (A6), c2 for a 2 [e2L;ba) equals,























and c2 for a < e2L is given by (A9).
Case 5: Indi¤erence condition holds for a = ea < e2L: Finally, when those with a = ea < e2L
are indi¤erent between choosing the national sector by expending e = ea and choosing the local
sector by expending the same ea on education, the indi¤erence condition is, from (20), (23), and
(9),
















Since those with a > ea expend e = minfa; e2Ng and choose the national sector and those with

































where e2N is given by (21).
H2N
H2L
and ea are obtained by solving (A13) and (A14). c2 for a  e2N is given by (30), c2 for
a 2 [ea; e2N ) is given by (A6), and c2 for a < ea is given by (A9).
Appendix B Proof of lemmas and propositions of the uncon-
strained case



































 1  1: (A15)
Denote the higher (lower) s satisfying the above equation with equality by s (s) [s < 1  (1 
) < s]; which exists when T2 and TN are not extemely low. The lemma is straightforward from
the equation.
Proof of Lemma 2. The result is straightforward from (28) when e2L = 0. When e

2L > 0; the
LHS of (29) decreases with H2N
H2L
and s, and the RHS increases with H2N
H2L
: Further, for s satisfying
e2L > 0; the RHS increases with s; because the derivative of the expression inside the curly bracket







































































Hence, c2 when e2L = 0 decreases with s: The same is true for net earnings in unit of the nal
good, because they equal consumption minus wealth.
(ii) Only the proof of the result on the consumption is presented, because net earnings in unit




> (<)0] From (30),
dc2
ds




















































































































































































































































Since B0 B1 > 0 from (A17),
dc2
ds
< 0 when s  :
When s < ;
dc2
ds











































































































































































is smaller than the RHS,
dc2
ds




Figure A1: The shape of the quadratic function
Figure A2: The shape of the cubic function
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Figure A3: The determination of the sign of
dc2
ds
for s < 















on the LHS of (A23) with
















































(1 )+ ; E1  1 +    , and E2 































From the rst line of the above equation, the derivative is 0 at s = 0 and negative at s = :
The sign of the derivative for s 2 (0; ) can be known by examining the shape of the above
cubic function. The derivative of the cubic function with respect to s equals
 3s2 + 2 [(1+E0+) + (1 )(E1+E2)]s  f[(1+E0)+E0] + (1 )E1E2g ;
which is negative at s = 0, while the sign at s =  is ambiguous.
The derivative of the quadratic function with respect to s equals 6s+2 [(1+E0+) + (1 )(E1+E2)] ;



















Hence, both s = 0 and s =  are located at the upward-sloping portion of the graph of the
quadratic function. Figure A1 shows a graph of the quadratic function. Based on this gure, Figure








is the same as the sign of the cubic function for s 2 (0; ] (the shapes are di¤erent because






f [(1 )+]sg(1 s) times the cubic function),
while, as shown above, the sign of the derivative at s = 0 is zero.









0; and the derivative is 0 at s = 0, is positive for s 2 (0; s]); and is negative for s 2 (s]; ):
Based on this result, Figure A3 illustrates graphs of the LHS and the RHS of (A23) when TN ,




the LHS is smaller (greater) than the RHS. Therefore,
dc2
ds
< 0 when s is small,
dc2
ds




< 0 again when s is large (note
dc2
ds
< 0 when s  ).
Proof of Proposition 1. (i) From Lemma 3 (i), net earnings and consumption of group 2
individuals decrease with s when e2L = 0: From (ii) of the lemma, if TN ; T2; N ; and L are low
enough, they decrease with s when e2L > 0 too and thus they decrease with s for any s. Even
when TN ; T2; N ; and L are high enough that net earnings and consumption increase with s for
intermediate s when e2L > 0 (Lemma 3 (ii)); they decrease with s for any s; if such range of s is




> 0; which is smax in Figure A3 and is smaller than , increases with TN ; T2; N ;
and L: From Lemma 1, e2L = 0 i¤ s  s and s  s (s < 1   (1   ) < s), where s decreases
(s increases) with TN , T2; N ; and L: Hence, if these exogenous variables are low enough that
smax  s; consumption and net earnings decrease with s for any s.
(ii) Only the proof of the result on the consumption is presented, because net earnings in unit
of the nal good equal consumption minus wealth. From the proof of (i), if TN ; T2; N ; and L are
high enough that smax > s; consumption increases with s when e2L > 0 and s is intermediate. From
Lemma 3, c2 decreases with s for small s; increases with s for intermediate s, and decreases with s
for large s; where, from Lemmas 1 and 3, c2 decreases with s at least for s  s and s  minf; sg.
Hence, c2 is maximized either at s = smax <  or at s = 0: From (30), c2 at an intermediate s




















































From (A22) in the proof of Lemma 3, s satises dc2
ds







. Hence, from this equation and (A26), the condition for c2 at












































Hence, if TN ; T2; N ; and L are is su¢ciently large, c2 at s = smax is greater than c2 at s = 0;
otherwise c2 at s = 0 is greater. From Figure A3 of the proof of Lemma 3 (ii), smax is the largest of
two values of s at which the LHS and the RHS of (A23) are equal. As TN , T2; N and L become
higher, the graph of the LHS shifts upward and thus smax increases.
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) From Lemma 1, h2L is lowest when s  s and s  s: When






















































































: When s  s and s  s and thus
e2L = 0, c2 decreases with s from the lemma. Hence, h

2N decreases with s as well.











































< 0 at least for s  minf; sg. The rest of the result can be proved similarly to
the corresponding proof on consumption of Lemma 3 (ii) and Proposition 1 (ii):
From (12), (21), and (22),
(h2N at s=0) > (<)(h















Then, the result that h2N is maximized at intermediate s (at s = 0) when TN , T2; N ; and L
are su¢ciently high (low) can be proved similarly to the corresponding proof on consumption of
Proposition 1 (ii):
Proof of e2N > e
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+l > 0: (A30)
Thus, e2N > e




































must hold. Therefore, e2N > e

2L is always true.
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